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CS 17607
35576 Cesson Sévigné Cedex, France
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Abstract—Migration processes of customers between alterna-
tive providers are becoming more and more relevant. Providers
competing for migrating customers may adopt a delaying strategy
to retain customers who are willing to leave, facing regulatory
sanctions for that unfair behaviour. A game-theoretic model is
proposed to describe the resulting competition among providers.
For that model, both stable and unstable Nash equilibria are
shown to exist and the providers’ equilibrium strategies can be
derived, in general numerically. In the stable equilibrium case the
delaying strategy predicted by the model introduces a mean delay
that is a strongly nonlinear (decaying) function of the sanction
value.
I. INTRODUCTION
The end of the monopolistic era in telecommunications
services has spurred the entry of a number of competing
providers in the market arena. Customers can now choose
among many different offers for the same service and are
allowed to freely migrate from a provider to another. Migration
phenomena (often indicated as churn) are particulary relevant
for mobile services, where annual churn rates as high as 25%
are often observed [1] and studies have been devoted to ascer-
tain the churn determinants (see e.g. the recent [2] and [3]). In
any migration process we can identify four stakeholders: the
customer (who initiates the process), the recipient provider,
the losing provider, and the regulatory authority (which sets
the rules for migration and checks for compliance). Since
the customer’s migration represents an economic loss for the
losing provider, the latter has no interest in accelerating the
migration process. Even when that process is led by the
recipient provider, the losing provider has the possibility of
delaying it, to the extent of reducing the effectiveness of the
liberalization process [4]. In the fight for customer retention
the losing provider may often be led to adopt unfair practices,
calling for the intervention of the regulatory authority, e.g.
through appropriate economic sanctions. The losing provider
must therefore evaluate the convenience of its delaying strat-
egy, by taking into account the pros linked to retaining the
customer (continuation of the revenue stream associated to
that customer) and the cons due to the possibility of incurring
the sanctions for the undue delay in migration operations. The
analysis reported in [5] has shown that the losing provider
may identify a maximum tolerable sanction value, relating it
to the customer lifetime value, i.e. the present value of the
future revenue stream generated by the customer. Though the
analysis has so far focused on the losing provider, the relative
ease with which the customer may change his provider may
however lead to a back-and-forth situation, in which competing
providers play both roles. In fact a provider may be a losing
one as well as a recipient one for a) the same customer
at different times; b) different customers at the same time.
The resulting competition between providers may be suitably
modelled through a game, where each provider has to choose
its delaying strategy. In this paper we propose a game-theoretic
model with two providers, that takes into account the strategies
of both providers competing for a migrating customer as well
as the behaviour of the customer and the danger represented by
sanctions. The model is then used to study the Nash equilibria
of the interaction among providers, and analyze the influence
of the sanction level on those equilibria.
II. MARKOV CHAIN MODEL OF USERS’ BEHAVIOR
The goal of this section is to model the switching behavior
of a customer between two available providers called A and
B. We assume that it is represented by the Markov chain1
depicted in Figure 1, the meaning of the four states being
defined in Table I. The transition from state 1 to state 2 (and
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Figure 1. Markov chain model of the customer’s switching behaviour
from state 3 to state 4) is for the customer willing to migrate
1We therefore implicitely assume that all events leading to a state change
occur after an exponentially distributed time.
State Meaning
1 Customer staying with provider A and unwilling to leave
2 Customer staying with provider A and willing to leave
3 Customer staying with provider B and unwilling to leave
4 Customer staying with provider B and willing to leave
Table I
STATES OF THE MARKOV CHAIN
to the other provider; the reverse transitions model instead the
customer reneging to the migration (due to winback actions
by the losing provider or to its delaying strategies). The actual
migration rates (from state 2 to state 3, and from state 4 to
state 1) depend either on a) the delay introduced by the losing
provider in the porting operation, or on b) the impatience of
the customer forcing the losing provider to comply with the
migration-supporting regulations. The resulting infinitesimal
generator is
R :=




−λ12 λ12 0 0
λ21 −(λ21 + λ23) λ23 0
0 0 −λ34 λ34
λ41 0 λ43 −(λ41 + λ43)




.
From standard Markov chain analysis, the steady-state
probability for each of the four states given by line vector
π = (πi)i=1,...,4 exists
2 and is given by the solution of
equations
πR = 0,
4
∑
i=1
πi = 1.
If c :=λ34λ41(λ23+λ21)+λ12λ23(λ41+λ43)+λ12λ34(λ41+λ23),
it can be readily checked that the solution is
π1 =
λ34λ41(λ23 + λ21)
c
π2 =
λ34λ41λ12
c
π3 =
λ12λ23(λ41 + λ43)
c
π4 =
λ12λ23λ34
c
.
(1)
The question is now, how do we relate some of the transition
rates appearing in the infinitesimal generator to the relevant
parameters of the problem? Our goal being to study the
retention policy of providers and defining regulation rules, we
introduce the average delay imposed by the two providers,
respectively TA and TB , and the suing rate µ taking into
account the attitude of the customer to force the migration
by taking legal actions against the delaying provider. We then
express the transition rates that mark the migration to the other
provider, i.e. λ23 and λ41, as the sum of two rates, since either
2Remark that when a provider i sets Ti = 0, the Markov chain described
before is degenerate: if TA = 0 for example then states 2 and 3 are only one
state. However the corresponding Markov chain with fewer states remains
ergodic as soon as all transmission rates are strictly positive, which will be
the case in the examples we consider.
the end of the retention period or the legal action taken by the
customer leads to a provider change:
λ23 =
1
TA
+ µ,
λ41 =
1
TB
+ µ.
(2)
With full generality, it seems also relevant that the other
rates depend on TA and TB too. Indeed, a customer could
be more inclined to switch (and to renege) depending on the
respective retention times of providers. We therefore let them
depend on the retention times, i.e., λ12 = λ12(TA, TB), λ21 =
λ21(TA, TB), λ34 = λ34(TA, TB) and λ43 = λ43(TA, TB).
Note that other parameters such as reputation of the provider,
price, etc., can also be included in those rates. Though, not
being the purpose of the current study, they are just hidden
and kept constant.
III. NON-COOPERATIVE GAME DESCRIPTION AND
ALGORITHMIC SOLUTION
The customer behavior having been described, we can now
investigate provider strategies. providers have an open interest
in keeping the customer, since any delay in the migration
allows the losing provider to keep the revenues associated
to that customer. On the other hand the legal actions taken
by the customer lead to a sanction s0. The utility function of
each provider, representing here their financial net benefits per
time unit at steady-state, is therefore given by the difference
between the average net profits associated to the customer
(respectively net revenues associated to customers pA or pB
times the probability of keeping the customer) and the average
sanction (which is levied only if the customer has expressed
his intention to leave the provider and has taken a legal action).
The resulting expressions of the utility function for the two
providers are therefore
UA = pA(π1 + π2) − s0π2µ,
UB = pB(π3 + π4) − s0π4µ.
(3)
In this competitive environment, each provider strives to find
its best strategy, i.e., its average retention time (assuming here
fixed revenues) maximizing its utility. But its utility depends
not only upon its own choice (from values of steady-state
probabilities πi, i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}), but also upon the strategy
choice of the opponent provider. In this situation, the solution
concept is that of Nash equilibrium from non-cooperative
game theory [6].
A Nash equilibrium is here an average retention time profile
T ∗ = (T ∗A, T
∗
B) from which no provider has any incentive to
deviate unilaterally. Formally,
T ∗A ∈ argmaxTA∈SUA(TA, T
∗
B) and
T ∗B ∈ argmaxTB∈SUB(T
∗
A, TB),
(4)
i.e., the best strategy provider i ∈ {A, B} can use is T ∗i given
that the strategy of the other provider is T ∗j (with j ∈ {A, B},
j 6= i). In (4), S is the strategy set of each provider. In general
we search our solution in the set of non-negative real numbers
S := R+, however we consider that very large values of the
retention time (larger than 1 year for example) are not realistic
and should not be considered. For the numerical analysis
carried out in Section V, we therefore take S = [O, Tmax]
for a given value of Tmax, which makes the strategy set of
each provider a compact and bounded set.
To determine practically the Nash equilibria (if any) of the
game played among providers, we define the best response
of each provider as a function S 7→ 2S of the strategy of its
opponent. Those best response functions are
BRA(TB) := arg max
TA∈S
UA(TA, TB) and
BRB(TA) := arg max
TB∈S
UB(TA, TB).
If we define the best response correspondance BR : S × S 7→
2S × 2S as BR(TA, TB) := {(tA, tB) ∈ S × S : tA ∈
BRA(TB), tB ∈ BRB(TA)}, then a Nash equilibrium is simply
a fixed point of the 2-dimensional function BR.
Therefore an exhaustive way to proceed to find Nash
equilibria is to follow Algorithm 1 described below.
Alg. 1 Graphically finding the Nash equilibria of the game
Input:
• the transition rates of the Markov chain in Figure 1,
as functions of the decision variables TA and TB (and
possibly prices),
• the values of prices pA and pB ,
• the value of the sanction s0.
1) For all possible values of TB in S, find the
set BRA(TB) of TA values in S that maximize
UA(TA, TB).
2) For all possible values of TA in S, find the
set BRB(TA) of TB values in S that maximize
UB(TA, TB).
3) On a same graphic, plot the best response functions
TA = BRA(TB) and TB = BRB(TA), as exemplified
in Figure 2.
4) The set of Nash equilibria is then the (possibly empty)
set of intersection points of those functions (see Fig-
ure 2).
Note that when the analytical derivation of the best response
is not feasible in step 1 of the algorithm, only a finite number
of values can be tried in practice. In the numerical results
presented in Section V, we use a given number (say, 500) of
equally spaced values in S.
BRA(TB) BRB(TA)
TA
TB
Nash
equilibria
Figure 2. Graphical determination of Nash equilibria (here the best response
of each user is unique, but this need not be the case in general).
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE GAME IN A SIMPLIFIED SETTING
Consider the special case where
λ12 = λ
λ34 = λ + ν
λ21 = α
λ43 = α
λ23 =
1
TA
+ µ
λ41 =
1
TB
+ µ,
for some fixed nonnegative values λ, ν, α, and µ. That is, only
the migration rates depend on retention times: the willingness
to leave or the reneging behavior are assumed constant. We
take λ34 > λ12 to introduce some asymetry into the game;
this models the fact that provider A has for instance a better
reputation (or could provide a better quality of service) than
provider B. To avoid dealing with too many parameters and
separating in several different cases, consider an arbitrarily
chosen example where λ = ν = 1, α = 2, µ = 4 and pA =
pB = 1. After simple computations, we get
UA = 2
(1 + 4TB) (1 + 7TA − 4s0TA)
3 + 18TA + 16TB + 88TBTA
UB =
(1 + 4TA) (1 + 8TB − 8s0TB)
3 + 18TA + 16TB + 88TBTA
.
We now consider the Nash equilibria of the game. Since we
manage to carry out an analytical study, we can take S = R+
here. Computing the partial derivatives of the utility functions
gives
∂UA
∂TA
= 2
(1 + 4TB) (3 − 12s0 + 8(3 − 8s0)TB)
(3 + 18TA + 16TB + 88TBTA)2
∂UB
∂TB
= 8
(1 + 4TA) (1 − 3s0 + (7 − 18s0)TA)
(3 + 18TA + 16TB + 88TBTA)2
.
We remark here that the numerator of each derivative does
not depend on the average retention time of the corresponding
provider. It can actually be easily checked that whatever the
values of parameters λ, ν, α, µ, pA and pB, this property is
verified.
Note also that ∂UA
∂TA
can be zero iff 1/4 ≤ s0 ≤ 3/8. Below,
it is always positive and above, always negative. Same thing
for ∂UA
∂TA
which can be zero iff 1/3 ≤ s0 ≤ 7/18.
Depending on the value of s0, we end up with several
possible cases.
• If s0 ≤ 1/3, provider B’s only interest is to set TB = ∞,
and therefore, the same strategy applies for provider A.
The unique Nash equilibrium is then (∞,∞). The reason
is that the sanction is too low to prevent the providers
from retaining abusively the customers.
• Similarly, if s0 ≥ 3/8, provider A’s interest is to set
TA = 0. At this value, the derivative of UB with respect to
TB is negative, meaning that TB = 0 is the best response.
The resulting unique Nash equilibrium is (0, 0). Here, the
sanction is too high for providers, their interest is to let
customers leave if they are willing to.
• Now, if 1/3 < s0 < 3/8, we then end up with three
possible Nash equilibria: (0, 0), (∞,∞) and (T ∗A, T
∗
B) =
( 1−3s07−18s0 ,
3−12s0
8(3−8s0)
). Indeed, in the later case, both deriva-
tives are null and we are at a (individual) maximum for
each provider. On the other hand, as soon as a player
i ∈ {A, B} plays Ti > T
∗
i , the other player has a
maximum at ∞, and then i also. The reasoning is similar
for Ti < T
∗
i , leading to (0,0).
This illustrates the interest of the analysis: determining
threshold values on the sanction fee in order to prevent
providers from retaining customers.
V. NUMERICAL ANALYSIS IN A COMPLEX CASE
In this section, we consider a more complex setting, where
all transition rates depend on the relative quality of the two
providers (via their mean retention time T ). We use here the
following model:
λ12 = λ ·
(
1 − ω + ω
TB − TA
TA + TB
)
λ34 = λ ·
(
1 − ω + ω
TA − TB
TA + TB
)
+ ν
λ21 = α ·
(
1 − ω + ω
TA − TB
TA + TB
)
λ43 = α ·
(
1 − ω + ω
TB − TA
TA + TB
)
λ23 =
1
TA
+ µ
λ41 =
1
TB
+ µ,
where λ, ν, α and µ are constant as in the previous section, and
ω is a constant that represents users sensitivity to providers
reputation in their churning decisions. This model reflects
the fact that a user is less likely to leave a provider that
retains customers, and is also more likely to renege because
he is reluctant to have to fight to churn. With such a model,
providers have an even stronger incentive to use retention
policies, because of the direct gain in terms of income during
the retention period and the indirect gain due to the fact that
users are less willing to leave.
Since an analytical study like the one carried out in the
previous section is not realizable anymore, we use numerical
computation following Algorithm 1 to determine the Nash
equilibria of the game and the influence of sanctions. We
present next an example where time is expressed in years,
with λ = 1/5 (which corresponds to around 20% of customers
willing to churn each year if TA = TB), ν = 1/10, α = 1/6
(mean reneging time of 2 months) and µ = 1/6. We also
take Tmax = 1 year, i.e. S = [0, 1], and pA = pB = p (no
price game among providers). Remark that due to the utility
functions (3), when both providers get the same revenues p
then the outcomes of the game depend only on the ratio s0/p.
Without sanctions (s0 = 0), our numerical computations
highlight that best response functions BRA and BRB simply
consist in choosing the highest possible retention time, i.e.
∀T ∈ S, BRA(T ) = BRB(T ) = Tmax. Therefore a sanction
s0 needs to be introduced to incentivize providers to reduce
their retention times. Figure 3 plots the best response functions
of both providers in the case when s0 = 10p. It appears that
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Figure 3. Nash equilibria with sanction s0 = 10p
there are two Nash equilibria, namely (TA, TB) = (0, 0) and
(TA, TB) = (0.29, 0.35). Notice however that only the latter
equilibrium is stable, since a small deviation of any of the
two providers from the point (TA, TB) = (0, 0) leads the best
response dynamics to that equilibrium. Notice also that at this
equilibrium, the provider that benefits from a better reputation
(modelled by the ν parameter) retains his customers less than
its opponent.
Increasing more the sanction value gives the same form
of best response functions as those presented in Figure 3. We
therefore focus now on the stable Nash equilibrium that a given
sanction level yields.
Figure 4 plots the strategies of each provider predicted by
our model when the sanction level s0/p changes. As could be
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Figure 4. Stable Nash equilibrium strategies when the sanction varies.
expected, increasing the sanction level indeed makes providers
reduce their mean retention time. However, unlike what was
observed in the simplified model of the previous section, it
seems that there is no threshold here for the value of s0
above which the only Nash equilibrium is (0, 0). Therefore
the sanction level has to be chosen such that the resulting
retention times be sufficiently small (say, less than 0.1 year,
which from Figure 4 corresponds to s0 ≥ 18p).
To compare the providers’ perception of both Nash equi-
libria of the game, we plot in Figure 5 their utilities at those
two possible outcomes when the sanction s0/p varies. Notice
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Figure 5. Providers’ utility at stable and unstable (if any) Nash equilibria.
that (TA, TB) = (0, 0) is not a Nash equilibrium when the
sanction is below 5.6p. In that case, the game has only one
Nash equilibrium (that is stable). This equilibrium consists in
each provider setting the largest possible retention time (here
Tmax = 1). We observe that provider A obtains a larger utility
than provider B in all cases due to its advantage ν.
Interestingly, it appears that both players would be better
off playing the unstable Nash equilibrium instead of the stable
one. Therefore the use of the sanction is justified by its effect
on the stable equilibrium: enforcing users to reduce their
retention time makes the outcome (TA, TB) get closer to the
more efficient situation (0, 0). Moreover, we also notice in
Figure 5 that when the stable equilibrium is different from
(Tmax, Tmax), i.e. for s0/p ≥ 8 in our example, an increase
in the sanction unexpectedly leads to an increase in both
providers’ utility. This also justifies the use of the sanction.
Consequently, we can say that for this model, the sanction
improves the user perceived quality of both providers (that is
decreasing in their retention times), but can also be beneficial
to both providers by enforcing their opponent to reduce its
retention time.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A game-theoretic model has been developed to describe the
behaviour of two service providers competing for migrating
customers. The model takes into account all the stakeholders,
namely the delaying behaviour of the two providers, the sanc-
tions levied by the regulatory authorities, and the impatience
of the customer waiting for the completion of the migration
process. A simplified setting has been examined to show the
use of the model. In that setting it has been shown that both
stable and unstable Nash equilibria exist. The stable equilib-
rium retention strategies, consisting in determining appropriate
mean delaying times, have been derived for both providers.
The game outcome predicted mean delay of each provider
appears to be a strongly non linear function of the sanction
imposed by the regulator.
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